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EVIDENCE-INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S TAX ACCRUAL WORKPAPERS
SHIELDED FROM IRS SUMMONS POWER BY ACCOUNTANT
WORK-PRODUCT PRIVILEGE.

United States v. Arthur Young & Co. (2d Cir. 1982)
On April 17, 1978, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a summons' directing Arthur Young & Co. (Arthur Young) 2 to produce all files
3
and records relating to its client, Amerada Hess Corporation (Amerada).
1. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1982) (No. 82-687). The summons was issued pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602 during an investigation of the tax returns of Amerada Hess Corporation (Amerada). Id. at 214. For the text of § 7602, see note 9 tmfra.
In the spring of 1976, it became known that many American companies had
made illegal payments abroad. 677 F.2d at 214. The board of directors of Amerada
formed a special committee to investigate any possible wrongdoing by Amerada. Id.
The law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, and the accounting firm of
Arthur Young & Co. (Arthur Young) were engaged to assist the committee. Id. This
investigation prompted the IRS, in August of 1977, to institute a criminal investigation of Amerada's tax returns for 1972, 1973, and 1974. Id.
2. 677 F.2d at 214. Arthur Young, a firm of certified public accountants, had
been the independent auditor of Amerada since 1971. Id. Arthur Young's duties
included responsibility for auditing financial statements prepared by Amerada in
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws. Id. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 12, 13, 15 U.S.C. § 781-m (1981); Regulation SX, Item 1-02, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1981). For a discussion on the duties and a description of independent auditors, see W. MEIGS, E. LARSEN & R. MEIGS, PRINCIPLES OF
AUDITING (6th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as W. MEIGS].
3. 677 F.2d at 215 n.4. The summons requested the following documents relating to Amerada's tax liability for the years 1972-74:
1. Engagement letters(s)
2. Management letter(s)
3. Representation letters(s)
4. History file(s)
5. Standard workpaper index(s)
6. Administrative file(s)
7. Workpaper review file(s)
8. Engagement planning file(s)
9. Confirmation control file(s)
10. Significant events file(s)
11. Audit program file(s)
12. Audit workpaper's file(s)
13. Tax pool analysis file(s)
14. File(s) prepared during the course of work performed for the "special
committee," including agreed procedures, selection process reports,
schedules, and other workpapers.
15. The name of the partner in charge, engagement partners and/or senior auditor who directed the audit of Amerada . ..
16. Any other information pertinent to the audit of Amerada . . . covering the years 1972, 1973 and 1974.
17. All workpapers, reports, records, correspondence, reconciliations, and
information relative to the United States Corporate Income Tax Re-
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The IRS moved to enforce this summons in district court 4 and Amerada
intervened. 5 The district court ordered compliance with the summons. 6 On
appeal, Arthur Young objected, inter aha, to the production of its tax accrual
workpapers. 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 8

turns (Forms 1120) of Amerada . . . that were prepared by [AY] or
under the supervision of [AY] for the calendar years 1972, 1973 and
1974.
Id.
4. Id. at 215. The matter came before the district court on an order to show
cause why Arthur Young should not have been compelled to obey the IRS summons.
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),a 'di part,
rev'd in part, 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982). The summons was served to Arthur Young
on April 17, 1978 and a copy was sent to Amerada. Id. at 1154. Amerada ordered
Arthur Young not to comply with the summons and intervened pursuant to 26
U.S.C. § 7609. Id. For a discussion of § 7609, see note 5 infra. The IRS then filed an
enforcement petition in district court on October 15, 1979. 496 F. Supp. at 1154.
5. 677 F.2d at 214, Amerada utilized the procedure available under 26 U.S.C.
§ 7609. Section 7609 provides that when a third-party record keeper is issued a summons, pursuant to § 7602, requiring the record keeper to turn over a third party's
business records, then the third party is entitled to intervene in any proceeding involving the enforcement of the summons and that party has the right to stay compliance with the summons by the third-party record keeper. 26 U.S.C. § 7609 (1981).
6. 496 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Judge Duffy tested the summons against
the criteria set down by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Powell.
Id. at 1184 (citing United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964)). The Powell
criteria are 1) the legitimacy of the investigation, 2) the relevancy of the materials,
3) the information must not already be possessed by the IRS, and 4) all required
administrative steps must have been followed. For a discussion of Powell, see notes
12-13 and accompanying text infra. Judge Duffy held that the summons met the
criteria of Powell for all but two of the types of documents requested. 496 F. Supp. at
1160. Arthur Young's audit program file, which states the procedures that Arthur
Young would perform on a given audit, was ruled irrelevant to Amerada's tax liability and thus beyond the summons power. Id. For a discussion of the relevancy limitation on the IRS summons power, see notes 14-17 and accompanying text infra. The
district court further refused to enforce the summons with respect to Arthur Young's
files on the work it had done for Amerada's special committee investigating possible
illegal payments. 496 F. Supp. at 1160. Judge Duffy held that, since this work was
done in anticipation of litigation, it was protected by the attorney work-product privilege. Id. For a discussion of the privilege limitation upon the summons power, see
notes 18-20 and accompanying text infra. For a list of the documents sought by the
IRS, see note 3 supra.
7. 677 F.2d at 213. Tax accrual workpapers or tax pool analyses are the documents generated by an auditor's examination of his client's potential tax liability,
and include the auditor's opinion of both the reasonableness of the client's tax position, and the adequacy of his provision for taxes. W. MEIGS, supra note 2, at 574. For
a further discussion of the nature of tax accrual workpapers, see note 23 and accompanying text infra.
The parties consented to a stay of production pending resolution of the matter
on appeal. 677 F.2d at 213. Arthur Young also objected to the production of its
audit workpapers. Id. at 215. The term audit workpapers may be summed up as follows: "It includes allevidence gatheredby the auditors to show the work they have done,
the methods and procedures they have followed and the conclusions they have developed." W. MEIGS, supra note 2, at 286 (emphasis supplied). The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision that the audit workpapers were within the scope
of the IRS summons power. 677 F.2d at 217. The court rejected Arthur Young's
argument that the audit workpapers were not relevant to the investigation. Id. at
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reversed the order compelling production of the tax accrual workpapers holding that in order to safeguard the interests of the investing public in fair and
honest securities transactions, an accountant work-product privilege must be
established to exempt tax accrual workpapers from the IRS summons power.
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted,
51 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1982) (No. 82-687).
Congress, in section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, granted the
IRS power to issue summonses relating to the investigation of any person's
tax liability. 9 The Supreme Court has stated that this summons power
should be accorded a broad scope1 ° in order to give the IRS the authority
necessary for effective enforcement of the revenue laws." In United States v.
215-16. For a discussion of the relevancy limitation on the IRS summons power, see
notes 14-17 and accompanying text infra. The court also rejected Arthur Young's
argument that the summons was so broad that it violated the fourth amendment,
stating that federal courts have consistently rejected such contentions and that the
Second Circuit has construed the summons power liberally. 677 F.2d at 216-17.
8. The case was heard by Chief Judge Feinberg and Circuit Judges Mansfield
and Newman. Chief Judge Feinberg wrote the Court's opinion. Circuit Judge Newman concurred in part and dissented in part.
9. 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1981). Section 7602 provides as follows:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a
return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person
for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or
collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may
be relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the
act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the
business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear
before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give
testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry ....
26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1981).
10. See United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975). The Court stated that a
restrictive interpretation of the summons power would be inconsistent with the language of § 7602. Id. at 149. The Court stated that no limitations were to be placed
on § 7602 "absent unambiguous directions from Congress." Id. at 150. The
Supreme Court has used this broad scope to uphold the validity of an IRS summons
in a number of cases. See, e.g., United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980) (the IRS
may compel handwriting exemplars under its summons power); United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975) (the IRS has the authority to issue a John Doe summons
to a bank in order to discover the identity of an individual unknown to it); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971) (under § 7602, an IRS summons may be
issued in aid of an investigation if it is issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution); United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964) (no
probable cause is needed for enforcement of an IRS summons).
11. See United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 715-16 & n.9 (1980). The issue in
Euge was whether the IRS could compel the production of a handwriting exemplar.
Id. The Court stated that there was a "formidable line of precedent" interpreting
congressional intent to uphold the enforcement power of the IRS when it was "necessary for the effective enforcement of the revenue laws and is not undercut by contrary
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Powell,' 2 the Supreme Court delineated the scope of the summons power:
He [the Commissioner] must show that the investigation will be
conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may
be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner's possession, and that the administrative steps required by the Code have been followed-in
particular [the Commissioner must have] determined the further
examination to be necessary .... 13
The relevancy requirement set forth in Powell has not been uniformly
interpreted by the Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Eighth Circuit in United
States v. Matras' 4 held that any documents not used in preparation of the tax
return were irrelevant.' 5 However, the majority of courts, including the Second Circuit,' 6 follow a more liberal test of whether the document sought
legislative purposes." Id. For the decisions cited by the Supreme Court, see note 10
supra.
12. 379 U.S. 48 (1964). Powell involved the judicial enforcement of an administrative summons requesting a corporate president to produce certain corporate tax
records for re-examination. Id. at 49. In addition to setting forth the four standards
for the enforcement of an IRS summons, the Court held that "the Commissioner
need not meet any standard of probable cause to obtain enforcement of his summons." Id. at 57. Therefore, the Court concluded that the records sought were
within the scope of the IRS summons and had to be produced. Id. at 51. For the
four Powell standards, see text accompanying note 13 tn/fa.
13. 379 U.S. at 57-58 (emphasis added).
14. 487 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973).
15. Id. at 1275. In Matras, the court faced the issue of whether budgets, which
are a projection of the future transactions of a business, are relevant to tax liability,
and therefore, within the scope of the IRS summons power. Id. at 1272-73. Because
the budgets do not reflect actual transactions, the court stated that their only bearing
on tax liability was to provide the IRS with a "roadmap" indicating where to look in
their investigation. Id. at 1273. The court concluded that such a roadmap may be
"convenient" for the IRS but that this did not equal relevancy udner the Powell
criteria, and, therefore, held that the budgets were not subject to the summons
power. Id. at 1275. For a discussion of the Powell criteria, see notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra.
The Tenth Circuit has also followed the "used in preparation" standard of relevancy. See United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977). For a
discussion of Coopers, see notes 28-29 and accompanying text infra.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Shlom, 420 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 1074 (1970). Shlom involved a summons by the IRS to compel the production of
a daily receipt record which was not used in preparation of a tax return. Id. at 26465. The court stated, "The test as to whether a record sought to be produced is
relevant or material to a tax inquiry within the meaning of § 7602(2) is 'whether the
inspection sought "might have thrown light upon" the correctness of the taxpayer's
returns.' " Id. at 265 (quoting Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 186-87 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959)). See also United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123 (2d
Cir. 1978) (internal audit reports of a corporation held to be relevant); Foster v.
United States, 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959) (records kept by
a bank dealing with the accounts of the taxpayer held to be relevant); United States
v. Acker, 325 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (minutes of board of directors meetings
and executive committee meetings were held to be relevant).
The Second Circuit has construed the "might have thrown light upon" test more
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"might throw light upon" the correctness of the tax return.'

7

8

Even when all of the Powell criteria are met, a summons may not be
enforced by a court if the material sought is protected by a privilege,' 9 such
as the attorney-client or attorney work product privilege, 20 or when enforcestrictly in cases of summonses issued to third-party "strangers" to the taxpayer. It
requires the IRS to show more than merely some chance that relevance exists. See,
e.g., United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1968).
The Second Circuit explicitly rejected the "used in preparation standard of the
Tenth Circuit in United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978). Noall involved
an IRS summons requesting the production of internal audit reports of Bunge Corporation. Id. at 124. These reports were an analysis of the bookkeeping procedures
of the company and were not used in the preparation of Bunge's tax returns. Id. at
125. The court rejected the Tenth Circuit's standard: "We find no significance in
the point, stressed by the appellant, that the internal audit reports and related work
papers were not used in preparing. . . income tax returns." Id. at 126. For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's standards, see notes 28-29 and accompanying text infra.
17. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982),peitionfor cert.
filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716). The El Paso Co. was
issued a summons requiring it to submit to the IRS all analyses prepared by the
Company concerning its tax liability. Id. at 533. The Fifth Circuit concluded that
the documents in question were relevant because they focused on the questionable
positions of the taxpayer's return, and, therefore, met the "might shed light upon"
test. Id. at 537. See also United States v. Wyatt, 637 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728
(9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1971); United
States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), appealdismzsedas
moot, 623 F.2d 720 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980); United States v.
Goldman, 453 F. Supp. 508 (C.D. Cal. 1978). For a discussion of Arthur Andersen, see
notes 30-31 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's
approach to relevancy, see note 16 and accompanying text supra.
18. For a discussion of the Powell criteria, see note 13 and accompanying text
supra.

19. See, e.g., United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 714 (1980). In Euge, the
Supreme Court stated that the congressional intent behind § 7602 was to codify a
broad testimonial obligation, including the provision of all physical evidence relevant
to a tax investigation. 444 U.S. at 714. However, the Court noted that § 7602 is still
"subject to traditional privileges and limitations." Id. For further discussion of Euge,
see note 11 supra. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this limitation by holding that that
an IRS summons is subject to the attorney-client and the attorney's work-product
privileges. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981). For a discussion of Upjohn, see note 20 infra.
In general, bases which may preclude or limit the IRS summons power are the
fifth amendment, testimonial privileges, attorney-client privilege, attorney workproduct privilege, the fourth amendment, expectations of privacy, search and seizure,
and compulsory process. Note, Government Access to Corporate Documents Auditors
Workpapers." Shall We Include Auditors Among the PrivilegedFew?, 2 J. CORP. L. 349, 35882 (1977). See also Kenerdine, The InternalRevenue Service Summons to Produce Documents.Powers, Procedures and Taxpayer Defenses, 64 MINN. L. REV. 73 (1979).
20. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). The Upjohn
decision involved an IRS summons to the general counsel of the Upjohn Co., demanding the production of questionnaires, filled out by Upjohn's employees and also
any notes related to them, prepared by Upjohn's attorneys in aid of an internal investigation of possible illegal payments by foreign subsidiaries. Id. at 386-88. The Court
reaffirmed its position that "a tax summons 'remains subject to the traditional privileges and limitations.' " Id. at 398 (quoting United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 714
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ment would undercut a contrary legislative purpose. 2 1
Whether the IRS's summons power reaches tax accrual workpapers is a
matter of controversy in both the legal and accounting professions. 22 Tax
accrual workpapers are the documentation of an independent auditor's analysis of the audited corporation's tax positions and may include determinations of tax settlement positions and determinations of contingent tax
liabilities. 23 One reason for the performance of this analysis by the auditor is
(1980)). The Court went on to say that nothing in the language of § 7602 or its
legislative history suggests that Congress did not intend the work product privilege to
apply to an IRS summons. 449 U.S. at 398. The Court held that the questionnaires
reflected attorney-client communications and were therefore protected by the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 398-99. The Court also held that Upjohn's attorney's
notes reflected mental processes, and, since the government had not shown sufficient
need, the notes were additionally protected by the work-product privilege. Id. For a
discussion of the work-product privilege, see notes 33-34 and accompanying text infra.
21. See United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 716 (1980). For a discussion of
Euge, see note 11 supra. The Supreme Court has not indicated which legislative purposes undercut the IRS summons power, however, it has been suggested that federal
securities laws which require disclosure to independent auditors by publicly held
companies may be one such area. For a discussion of this position and the applicable
securities laws, see notes 24-26 & 32 and accompanying text 1nfra.
22. See Caplin, Should the Service be Permitted to Reach Accountant's Tax Accrual
Workpapers?, 51 J. TAx'N 194 (1979). See also Caplin, IRS Toughens its Stance on Summoning Accountants' Tax Accrual Workpapers, 53 J. TAX'N 130 (1980); Hanson & Lees,
IRS Examination of Accountants' Workpapers, 143 J. ACCOUNTANCY 60 (1977);
Kenerdine, supra note 19; Kurtz and Panel, Discussion on "Questionable Positions," 32
TAX LAw. 13 (1978); Robinson & Stoltenberg, PrivilegeandAccountants' Workpapers, 68
A.B.A.J. 1248 (1982). Saltzman, Accountants and the IRS Summons. Recent Developments,
7 TAx ADVISOR 516 (1976); IRSEyes Accountants, 67 A.B.A.J. 1703 (1981); Note, supra
note 19.
23. See Note, supra note 19, at 357. That commentator stated,
Among the items the auditor must review in the course of an audit
examination is the client's financial treatment of contingent liabilities.
Contingent liabilities are potential obligations involving a considerable degree of uncertainty that may develop into actual liabilities at some future
time. Since income tax liability is a material factor in computing a corporation's net income, the likelihood of additional tax assessments may constitute a contingent liability of major concern in the course of an audit
examination. Therefore, an auditor cannot express an opinion without determining that the financial statements reasonably reflect possible future
challenges by the government to the client's tax affairs.
In auditing a client's tax reserve, an auditor reviews with corporate
officers the corporation's tax returns for the most recent years, with particular emphasis on any transactions of a sensitive nature. The auditor's tax
reserve workpapers are a memorialization of the auditor-management analysis and may include copies of client documents, memorandums of conversations with client personnel, details of the corporation's negotiations
posture, and settlement estimates with regard to particular transactions. In
the course of the tax-reserve analysis, the auditor purports neither to conduct a factual investigation nor to form an opinion whether tax fraud or
other wrongs have been committed. Rather, the auditor reviews the corporation's tax affairs solely for the purpose of determining if the probable result of any potential tax challenge is properly reflected in the financial
statements.
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to assure his client's compliance with federal securities laws which require
disclosure of contingent liabilities. 24 The independent auditors contend
1) that these papers are beyond the reach of an IRS summons because they
do not meet the relevancy requirements of Powel125 and 2) that the papers
26
are protected by an auditor-client or accountant-client privilege.
The relevance of an independent auditor's tax accrual workpapers to an
IRS investigation of tax liability has engendered a split of authority among
the two federal courts which have decided the issue. 27 When the issue of tax
accrual workpapers was brought before the Tenth Circuit in United States v.
Coopers &Lybrand, 28 it held that the workpapers were irrelevant because they
were not used in preparing the taxpayer's return. 2 9 In contrast, the District
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Caplin, Should the Service be Permrted to Reach Accountants' Tax Accrual Workpapers?, supra note 19, at 194.

24. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 12-13, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-m (1981); Regulation S-X, item 1-02, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(d) (1981). Section 12 of the 1934 Act
provides in pertinent part as follows: "(b) A security may be registered on a national
securities exchange by the issuer filing an application . . . which . . . shall contain(1) such information . . . as . . . (J) balance sheets . . . certified . . . by idependent
public accountants; [and] (K) profit and loss statements . . . certifxd . . . by independent

public accountants; .
'..." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12,
15 U.S.C. § 781
(1981) (emphasis added). Section 13 of the 1934 Act provides that "(a) Every issuer
of a security registered pursuant to section 12 . . . shall file . . . (2) such annual
reports . . . certied . . . by independent public accountants . ...
." Id. § 13, 15 U.S.C.

§ 78m (emphasis added). Item 1-02 of Regulation S-X provides as follows: "The
term 'audit' (or 'examination') when used in regard to financial statements, means an
examination of the statements by an accountant in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards for the purpose of expressing an opinion thereon." Regulation S-X, Item 1-02, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(d) (1981). A performance of an audit
which conforms with generally accepted auditing standards includes a review of contingent tax liabilities. See Note, supra note 19, at 357. For a discussion of generally
accepted auditing standards, see W. MEIGS, supra note 22, at 22.
25. See Caplin, Should the Service be Permitted to Reach Accountants Tax Accrual

Workpapers?, supra note 22, at 194. In discussing the scope of the IRS summons
power, Caplin states:
It is the position of the AICPA [American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants]: (a) that tax accrual workpapers reflect opinions, projections
and judgments and, thus, are not the type of "data" envisaged by Section
7602; (b) that they are not prepared for tax purposes, but rather to assist
accountants in estimating contingent liabilities for financial reporting and
SEC purposes; and (c) that they are frequently prepared after tax return
has been completed and are not "relevant" to the preparation of a correct
tax return or the determination of tax liability.
id.
26. For a discussion of the auditor-client privilege, see notes 32-39 and accompanying text tnfra.
27. See notes 28-31 and accompanying text infra.
28. 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
29. Id The Coopers & Lybrand decision involved an IRS summons issued to the
public accounting firm.of Coopers & Lybrand requesting it to produce all records
relating to its audit of Johns-Manville, Inc. Id. at 617. All the requested material was
produced except Coopers & Lybrand's audit program and tax pool analysis (tax accrual workpapers). Id The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
denied enforcement of the summons as to these items. Id at 617-18. See also 413 F.
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Court of Massachusetts in United Slates v. Arthur Andersen & Co. ,30 held that
tax accrual workpapers were relevant because they "might throw light
31
upon" the return.
Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit first noted that § 7602 had
limitations. 550 F.2d at 619-20. The court then pointed out that one such limitation
was that imposed in Matras-that the relevancy requirement imposed by Powell
could not be met merely by showing that the required documents served the convenience of the IRS. Id at 621-21. The court concluded as follows:
Applying these standards, we hold that the court properly found that
the tax pool analysis file was not relevant and therefore not subject to the
production under the summons. In this respect we deem it worthy of repeating that it was uncontroverted that the tax pool analysis file was not
prepared in connection with or used to facilitate the preparation and filing
of J-M's tax returns and that C&L has no responsibility for any J-M tax
matters.
Id. at 621. For a discussion of Matras, see note 15 supra.
The Second Circuit explicitly rejected this test in United States v. Noall, 587
F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978). For a discussion of Noall, see note 16 and accompanying text
supra. The Noall court also stated that the Tenth Circuit's reasoning on the subject of
tax accrual workpapers was not authoritative in the Second Circuit. 587 F.2d at 127.
The Noall court concluded, however, that "[w]e need not and do not express any
opinion as to what we would do if confronted with the precise problem of the tax
pool analysis presented to the Tenth Circuit in Coopers & Lybrand." Id at 127 n.5.
30. 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).
31. Id. Arthur Andersen & Co., (Arthur Andersen) was issued a summons to
.turn over various records regarding its client, Good Hope Industries, Inc., which was
under IRS investigation. Id at 324. Arthur Andersen objected to the production of
these documents on both privilege and relevancy grounds. Id at 325. The court
rejected the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in Coopers & Lybrand that tax accrual
workpapers were not relevant because they were not used in preparation of the tax
returns in question. Id. at 329 (citing United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d
at 621). For a discussion of Coopers &Lybrand, see notes 28-29 supra. The court stated
that the language of § 7602(2) ("may be relevant or material") invited a liberal construction of the statute. 474 F. Supp. at 329 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 7602 (1981)). For the text
of § 7602(2), see note 9 supra.
The court also distinguished the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Matras from the Arthur Andersen case, stating that tax accrual workpapers, unlike the
budget sought in Matras, were more than a mere "roadmap." 474 F. Supp. at 330
(citing United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d at 1273). For a discussion of Matras, see
note l5supra. Furthermore, the court noted that there was broad support for holding
that relevancy did not depend on whether the documents were used in preparation of
the tax return. 474 F. Supp. at 330 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d
123 (2d Cir. 1978)). For a discussion of Noall, see note 17 and accompanying text
supra. Therefore, the court concluded that the tax accrual workpapers "may be"
relevant, thus satisfying that Powell standard. 474 F. Supp. at 330.
The court also rejected Arthur Andersen's argument for an accountant-client
privilege, noting that the Supreme Court had stated "that no confidential accountant-client privilege exists under federal law." Id at 332 (quoting United States v.
Couch, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1972)). For a discussion of Couch, see notes 36-38 and
accompanying text infta. For a discussion of the proposed accountant-client privilege, see notes 32-33 and accompanying text infra.
In addition to rejecting Arthur Andersen's arguments on both relevancy and
privilege grounds, the court evaluated the summons request against the other Powell
criteria and found that the summons did not violate any of these criteria. 474 F.
Supp. at 328-31. The court therefore held that Arthur Andersen was required to

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss2/4

8

Markowitz: Evidence - Independent Auditor's Tax Accrual Workpapers Shielded
442

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28: p. 434

As an alternative to contesting the relevance of tax accrual workpapers,
it has been suggested that such workpapers should be protected by an accountant-client privilege because of the confidentiality needed to perform
the audit function. 3 2 This privilege would be similar to the attorney's workproduct privilege established by Hitckman v. Taylor 3 3 and codified in rule
26(b)(3) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedures. 3 4 Under this privilege, tax
accrual workpapers would be protected unless the IRS demonstrated a compelling need for their production. 3 5 However, in Couch v. United Stales, 3 6 a
comply with the summons. Id. at 332. For a discussion of the Powell criteria, see
notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra.
32. See, e.g., Caplin, Should the Servtce be Permitted to Reach Accountants' Tax Accrual
Workpapers?, supra note 22; Kenerdine, supra note 19; Note, supra note 19. AICPA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

Rule 301 (1973) provides as follows: "A member

shall not disclose any confidential information obtained in the course of a professional engagement except with the consent of the client." Id.
The necessity for this privilege has been summed up as follows: "The relationship between a corporation and its auditor is essentially confidential. In the course of
an audit examination, the auditor acquires an intimate knowledge of the client's
most private business secrets and confidences. . . . Much of that information is considered highly confidential by the client." See, Note, supra note 19 at 353 (footnotes
omitted).
One commentator suggests that if the IRS were to have access to tax accrual
workpapers, the client would be reluctant to divulge information to his auditor. See
Caplin, Should the Service be Permitted to Reach Accountant's Tax Accrual Workpapers?, supra
note 22 at 194. Caplin concludes that allowing access would undermine the integrity
of the auditing process by stifling the free flow of information between client and
auditor. Id The AICPA states that it is not trying to create a new privilege, but
bases its position on what it considers a proper interpretation of the tax code. Id
33. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Htckman involved the sinking of a tugboat under unusual circumstances. id.at 498. The tug's owners engaged counsel who interviewed
the tug's four survivors with an eye toward anticipated litigation by representatives
of the victims of the sinking. Id During the discovery process, in a suit by the representative of one of the victims, an interrogatory was directed toward the tug's counsel
asking him to disclose the context of the interviews with the survivors. Id The Court
held that an attorney's "work-product" (ie., documents, memoranda, and mental
impressions drafted or formulated in anticipation of litigation) was privileged in discovery unless the opposing counsel could meet the burden of establishing adequate
reasons to compel disclosure. 329 U.S. at 511-12.
34. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3). Rule 26(b)(3) provides in pertinent part as
follows:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable. . . and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or
for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including
his attorney, consultant, surety indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.
In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been
made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions,
conslusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative
of the party concerning the litigation.
Id.
35. See Note, supra note 19, at 382-88 & n.236. That commentator suggests that
the auditor-client privilege should not parallel the attorney-client privilege, which
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criminal tax case, the Supreme Court opined in dicta that no accountantclient privilege existed under federal law, and that no state-created privilege
had been recognized in federal cases. 3 7 Although Couch involved a criminal
prosecution, 38 this dicta was recently utilized by the Fifth Circuit to deny
39
the existence of such a privilege.
It was against this background that the Arthur Young court began its
analysis of the power of the IRS to compel disclosure of tax accrual
workpapers. 40 The court first confronted the issue of whether the summoned
documents were relevant to a civil audit.4 ' The court specifically rejected
the Eighth and Tenth Circuits' view that tax accrual workpapers are irreleprecludes access to relevant material unless it is waived by the client, but should
instead emulate the attorney's work-product privilege, which exists absent a showing
of a compelling need for the information. Id at 387 n.236. For a proposal of a
similar privilege, see Caplin, Should the Service be Permitted to Reach Accountant's Tax Accrual Workpapers?, supra note 22, at 194. For a discussion of the attorney's work-product privilege, see note 20 supra.
36. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
37. Id. Couch involved an IRS summons demanding records that the taxpayer
had given to an independent accountant for the purpose of preparing her tax return.
Id. at 324. The taxpayer argued that, because of the confidential relationship she
had with her accountant, she had an expectation of privacy which protected her
records under the fourth and fifth amendments. Id at 335. The court rejected her
argument, stating that there could be no expectation of privacy where the accountant is under an obligation to disclose the information on the tax return. Id The
court also stated unequivocally that no justification exists for an accountant-client
privilege when the records are involved in a criminal investigation. Id The Court
held that, since no privilege existed, the taxpayer could not prevent the disclosure of
these records to the IRS because she had no expectation of privacy in them. Id.
38. See id.
39. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 1982),petitzonfor
cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716). The El Paso company
had turned over its attorney's own tax pool analysis to its independent auditors for
review. d The Court stated that the Fifth Circuit did not recognize an accountantclient privilege, and that the Supreme Court in Couch had concluded that non had
been found by any federal court. Id The court went on to hold that turning over the
tax pool analysis to the independent auditors destroyed its confidentiality in regard
to any attorney-client privilege, and, therefore, the documents could be summoned
by the IRS. Id. See also United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322,
327 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1021 (1980). For a discusion of Arthur Andersen, see notes 31-31 and accompanying text supra.
40. 677 F.2d at 217-21. Arthur Young advanced two arguments challenging the
IRS's power to compel production of its tax accrual workpapers; relevancy and privilege. Id. at 218-21. Amerada intervened and made similar objections. Id. at 217.
Amerada argued that the IRS summons was issued pursuant to a criminal investigation of the company, and therefore the relevance of the tax accrual workpapers must
be measured by the parameters of that investigation. Id at 217-18. The court rejected that argument, stating that Amerada had not shown that the IRS agreed to
limit its investigation of Amerada to only criminal matters. Id at 218. For a discussion of audit and tax accrual workpapers, see notes 7 & 23 supra.
41. 677 F.2d at 218-19.
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vant because they are not used in the preparation of tax returns. 42 In reaching this conclusion, the court focused on the fact that the summons power
has always been interpreted as a broad mandate, 43 and consequently it applied that standard which the Second Circuit has consistently used as its test
of relevance-whether the documents requested "might have thrown light
upon" the correctness of a return. 44 The Arthur Young court further concluded that because tax accrual workpapers indicate the tax positions of the
company, and because these positions help determine the amount of tax lia45
bility, the workpapers clearly met this low threshold of relevancy.
The finding of relevancy, however, did not lead to the automatic enforcement of the summons. 46 The court referred to two recent Supreme
Court decisions, which further delineated the scope of the IRS summons
power.4 7 First it noted that, in United States v. Euge, 48 the Supreme Court
recognized that "contrary legislative purposes" could undercut IRS authority, 49 and secondly, that both Euge and Upjohn v. United States 50 held that
42. Id. at 218. The court summarized the positions of the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits as follows:
Tax accrual workpapers reflect what the taxpayer-and his accountantthink about transactions that have already taken place; budgets reveal how
the taxpayer hopes to conduct his affairs in the future. They are thus both
irrelevant to the question of actual transactions, and therefore to the issue of
liability for taxes.
Id. The court then stated it could not agree with such a strict definition of relevance.
Id The court stated that it had previously rejected the argument that documents
that were not used in preparing audited returns were irrelevant. Id at 123 (citing
United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 1978). For a discussion of Noall, see
note 16 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits' views on relevance, see notes 15 & 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
43. 677 F.2d at 218. The court stated that "[t]he summons power has consistently been interpreted as a broad mandate, designed to give the Service the 'authority . . . necessary for the effective enforcement of the revenue laws .... .' " Id.
(quoting United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1980)). The court went on to
cite other examples of this broad mandate. Id (citing United States v. Bisceglia, 420
U.S. 141 (1975); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971); United States v.
Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964)). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 10-13 supra.
44. 667 F.2d at 218. For previous cases applying this test, see United States v.
Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Shlom, 420 F.2d 263, 265
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1074 (1970); Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d
183, 187 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959); United States v. Acker, 325 F.
Supp. 857, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). For a discussion of these cases, see note 16 and
accompanying text supra.
45. 677 F.2d at 218-19.
46. Id The court stated that other considerations had to be taken into account
before it could render its decision. Id. For a discussion of these considerations, see
notes 48-58 and accompanying text infra.
47. Id. (citing United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980); Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)).
48. 444 U.S. 707 (1980).
49. 677 F.2d at 219 (citing United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. at 716). For a discussion of Euge, see note 11 and accompanying text supra.
50. 449 U.S. 383 (1982). For a discussion of Upjohn, see note 20 and accompanying text supra.
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51
common law privileges limit IRS power.
52
Having established these limitations upon the IRS summons power,
the court stated that it read Hickman and Rule 26(b) (3) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure as requiring it, in all cases, to balance the public policies
favoring confidentiality of certain information against a party's need for that
information. 53 The court stated that this case involved a conflict between
the IRS's need for information 54 and the public interest in fair and honest
markets for securities transactions, 55 the latter of which requires a free exchange of confidential information between a client and its independent auditor. 56 The court then weighed these two policies 57 and stated that,
although lack of this information would be inconvenient for the IRS, 58 the

51. 677 F.2d at 219. TheArthur Young court held that the limitations on § 7602
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Euge and Upjohn should be used to protect tax
accrual workpapers which presented appropriate countervailing policies. Id. For a
discussion of these countervailing policies and how the court dealt with them, see
notes 54-58 and accompanying text tnfra.
52. 677 F.2d at 219. For a discussion of the limitations noted by the Arthur
Young court, see notes 18-26 and accompanying text supra.
53. 677 F.2d at 219. The court noted that although Hitkman and rule 26 (b)(3)
concerned discovery, "neither the [Supreme] Court nor Congress expressed an intent
to limit the doctrine to the discovery context .

. . ."

Id. (citing Upjohn Co. v.

United States, 449 U.S. at 398). For a discussion of Hickman, see note 33 supra. For
the text of rule 26(b)(3), see note 34 supra.
54. 677 F.2d at 219. The court stated that the IRS's need for the information
was based upon "the legitimate interest of society in enforcement of its laws and
collection of the revenues." Id (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336
(1973)). For a discussion of Couch, see notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra. The
court further stated that Congress had protected this interest by granting the IRS
extensive powers. 677 F.2d at 219.
55. 677 F.2d at 219. The court stated that the public interest in fair and honest
markets for securities has been vindicated by extensive regulation of the securities
industries. Id. The court then pointed out that some of those. laws require verification by independent accountants, Id (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12,
15 U.S.C. § 781 (1981); Regulation S-X, Item 1-02, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(d)). For a
discussion of the requirements of the statutes and regulations, see note 24 and accompanying text supra.
56. 677 F.2d at 220. The court stated that the lack of confidentiality (by allowing the IRS access to tax accrual workpapers), might cause a prudent corporate
taxpayer not to be candid with its independent auditors. Id The court postulated
that this would hinder the audit procedure and, as a result, affect the accuracy of the
audit. Id For a discussion of the audit process, see W. MEIGS, supra note 2. For a
discussion of the need for auditor-client confidentiality, see note 32 and accompanying text supra. See also W. MEIGS, supra note 2, at 55-56.
57. 677 F.2d at 220-21. The court noted that these two interests (the collection
of revenue and reliability in securities transactions) were both congressionally mandated policies. Id at 220. Therefore, the court noted, that when the IRS seeks production of tax accrual workpapers, one of these policies must bend. Id.
58. 677 F.2d at 220. The court stated that failure to give the IRS summons
power complete latitude in this area would simply deprive the IRS of a roadmap to
the taxpayer's thoughts. Id However, since the case did not involve allegations of
fraud, the court reasoned that the IRS did not need to know the taxpayer's thoughts
and concluded that all the raw data needed for the IRS to calculate tax liability was
in the corporation's own books and the audit workpapers. Id.
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exposure of the tax accrual workpapers to the Service would undermine "the
procedure designed by Congress to protect the investing public from inaccurate financial information" by encouraging less than complete disclosure
of potentially vunerable tax positions. 59 Because of this contrary legislative
purpose, the court concluded it could limit the otherwise broad mandate of
section 7602.60 Therefore, in order to protect the investing public, it created
a work-product privilege similar to that fashioned in Hickman:6 1 tax accrual
workpapers would be privileged except where the IRS could make a suffi62
cient showing of need for their production.
Judge Newman filed a concurring and dissenting opinion 63 in which he
stated that he believed Congress had already resolved this conflict in favor of
64
the IRS by granting it the power to summon all relevant information.
However, he stated that even if the grant of broad summons power left open
the issue of whether an accountants' work-product privilege should be created to shield tax accrual workpapers, the decision to establish such a privilege should be made by Congress, not the courts. 65 Finally, Judge Newman
59. Id. at 220. The court further stated that the investing public "relies most
exclusively on the data generated as a result of the SEC laws." Id at 220-21.
60. Id at 221. For a discussion of the broad scope traditionally given to § 7602,
see notes 10-11 and accompanying text supra.
61. 677 F.2d at 221. The court concluded that a work-product privilege would
protect those who benefit from enforcement of securities laws while also allowing the
IRS access to the tax accrual workpapers on the rare instances where it can make a
showing of sufficient need. Id. (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 512-13 and
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)). For a discussion of Hickman, see note 33 supra. For the
relevant text of rule 26(b)(3), see note 34 supra.
62. 677 F.2d at 221. The Arthur Young court went on the state that Congress
could always eliminate the privilege by statute if they felt it unduly restricted the IRS
summons power. Id The Arthur Young court then concluded that in the present case
the IRS had not made a sufficient showing of need to overcome the work-product
privilege. Id For a discussion of the work-product privilege, see notes 33-34 and
accompanying text supra.
63. 667 F.2d at 221 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Newman concurred with the portion of the majority opinion upholding enforcement of the summons with respect to audit work papers and that portion determining that the tax accrual workpapers were relevant. Id
64. Id. Judge Newman stated that by enacting § 7602, Congress gave the IRS
"a broad summons authority to seek all information 'relevant to a legitimate investigative purpose .... ' " Id. (quoting United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 146
(1975)). For a discussion of Biscegh'a, see note 10 and accompanying text supra.
Judge Newman noted that the majority held that the tax accrual workpaper
were relevant to a legitimate investigative purpose. 677 F.2d at 221 (Newman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Newman then stated that, absent
any pre-existing privilege (ie., attorney-client or other traditional common law privilege), the court must enforce a summons upon a determination that § 7602 applies.
Id.
65. 677 F.2d at 222 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Newman pointed out that the Supreme Court has authoritatively stated that
no limitations are to be placed on the scope of § 7602 "absent unambiguous direc-r
tions from Congress." Id. (quoting United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 150
(1975)). He further argued that the majority's fashioning of a privilege inverted the
proper relationship between the courts and Congress. 677 F.2d at 222 (Newman, J.,
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opined that even if the courts were to enter this policy debate, such a privilege should be rejected because of the lack of similarity between the account66
ant-client and attorney-client relationships.
In evaluating the Arthur Young decision it is suggested that the court
properly rejected the irrelevancy argument 67 in deciding that tax accrual
workpapers fall within the scope of the IRS summons power. The court
correctly observed that the statutory language 68 and prior Second Circuit
70
69
decisions interpreting this language call for a low threshold of relevance,
71
and, therefore, the tax accrual workpapers were relevant.
While it is true that tax accrual workpapers are clearly relevant to an
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Newman also pointed out that, in
the area of tax laws, where Congress annually reviews the law, any recognition of
new privileges is especially a task of Congress. Id
66. 677 F.2d at 222-24 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Newman rejected the policy argument that "the privilege is needed to ensure
that public corporations will be truthful with their accountants in fulfilling their statutory obligations to file financial statements verified by independent accountants."
Id. He stated that the majority's argument was based on a belief that if no privilege
existed, some corporations would deceive their accountants concerning the existence
of debatable tax items in order to prevent disclosure. 677 F.2d at 223 (Newman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Newman rejected this argument on
the basis that few corporations would take this action, and even if a few are so
tempted, the courts should not provide those corporations with a privilege to shield
their behavior from detection. Id
Judge Newman also noted that the rationale creating the work-product privilege
for an attorney could not support an analogous grant of such a privilege to an independent auditor. Id. at 224 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). He cited substantial differences between the attorney-client and accountantclient relationships. Id Judge Newman stated that the work-product privilege
granted to the attorney assures the privacy necessary to fulfill the client's constitutional right to effective counsel. Id However, he reasoned, the independent auditor
owed his primary duty not to his client, but to the public. Id
67. 677 F.2d at 218-19. For a discussion of the relevancy argument, see notes
14-17, 27-31 and accompanying text supra.
68. See 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1981). For the relevant text of§ 7602, see note 9supra.
69. For a discussion of the Supreme Court decisions on the scope of § 7602, see
notes 10-13 and accompanying text supra. For the Second Circuit decisions on the
scope of § 7602, see note 16 and accompanying text supra.
70. For a discussion of the relevance standard of § 7602, see notes 12-17 and
accompanying text supra. The threshold of relevancy called for by the Second Circuit when it tested information against the Powell standard is whether the information would "throw light upon the correctness of the return." See note 16 supra. It is
submitted that this standard is clearly easier for the IRS to meet than the "used in

preparation" standard of relevance advocated by the Eighth and Tenth Circuits. For
a discussion of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits' approach, see notes 15 & 28-29 and

accompanying text supra.
71. 677 F.2d at 218-19. Given the Second Circuit's standard of relevancy it

would have been difficult for the court to find tax accrual workpapers irrelevant. See
id. at 219. It is clear that since tax accrual workpapers analyze what the auditor feels
is the proper tax liability of the corporation, tax accrual workpapers more than meet
this low standard of relevancy. For a discussion of relevance under § 7602, see notes
12-17 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of tax accrual workpapers, see
note 22 supra.
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IRS summons, there is a persuasive policy argument in favor of a privilege
protecting these workpapers. 72 This privilege is necessary due to the importance, in terms of securities law, of the confidentiality between independent
75
73
However, Couch 74 and subsequent decisions
auditors and their clients.
clearly indicate that an independent auditor-client privilege is not one of the
traditional privileges which the Supreme Court has stated limit the scope of
an IRS summons. 76 Therefore, it is submitted that the importance of the
Arthur Young court's decision is its astute recognition that the legislative purposes embodied in the federal securities laws are contrary to those present in
the IRS summons power 77 and therefore serve to limit the scope of the sum78
mons power, in spite of the absence of a traditional common law privilege.
It is further submitted that the establishment of an auditor's work-prod79
uct privilege is the most logical solution to this clash of legislative policies.
The privilege assures confidentiality in the auditor-client relationship, thus
promoting the enforcement of securities laws. At the same time, it permits
the IRS access to the tax accrual workpapers if the Service can demonstrate
sufficient need. 80 However, given the Supreme Court's mandate against lim72. For example, such a privilege would protect the confidentiality that is necessary to facilitate the relationship of client to auditor. See note 32 supra. Since this
relationship helps the auditor have a better understanding of his client's business, the
possibility of the public's relying on inaccurate financial statements is diminished. Id
73. For a discussion of the need for auditor-client confidentiality, see note 32
and accompanying text supra.
74. See 409 U.S. at 335. It should also be noted that although Couch was decided
nine years ago, its dicta that "no confidential accountant-client privilege exists under
federal law" has been recently followed by the Fifth Circuit and the District Court of
Massachusetts. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982),pellon
for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716); United States v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal dismissed as moot,
623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denid, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980). For a discussion of El Paso,
see notes 16 & 37 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Arthur Andersen,
see notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra.
75. See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1981),petitionfor
cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716); United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal dismissed as moot, 623
F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980). For a discussion of El Paso, see
notes 17 & 39 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Arthur Andersen, see
notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra.
76. For a discussion of the traditional limitations on the scope of an IRS summons, see note 19 supra.
77. For a discussion of the Arthur Young court's analysis of these policies, see notes
54-62 and accompanying text supra.
78. See United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 716 (1980). For a discussion of
Euge, see note 11 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of contrary legislative policies undercutting IRS authority, see note 21 and accompanying text supra.
79. For a discussion of the work-product doctrine fashioned by the court, see
note 61 and accompanying text supra.
80. See Note, supra note 19 at 382-88. It has been suggested that a limited privilege for auditors, similar to a work-product privilege, "strikes the balance between
the competing societal interests at issue in this controversy, full disclosure within a
valued relationship [that of auditor to client] and maximum disclosure in judicial
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itation of the IRS summons power without express congressional direction, 8 '
this solution would be more appropriate in the form of federal legislation
than as a result of court decision.8 2 Nevertheless, when the Supreme Court
decides this issue, it is submitted that they should construe this situation as
one involving a contrary legislative purpose-the public's interest in fair and
honest securities transactions-which may, in accordance with Euge, 8 3 undercut the IRS summons power.8 4 Moreover, the Court should then abandon its dicta in Couch8 5 by forging a limited privilege for independent
auditors' tax-accrual workpapers in order to balance these policies.
In reviewing the immediate impact of the decisions, it is clear that the
Second Circuit now recognizes a limited privilege for some documents of
independent auditors.8 6 However, it is submitted that this privilege is applicable solely to tax accrual workpapers8 7 prepared in an audit performed in
fulfillment of federal securities law requirements. 88 Nevertheless, the IRS
may still reach these documents on a showing of sufficient need, such as the
unavailability of the corporation's own records. 89
Outside of the Second Circuit, it is doubtful that this decision will provide the impetus for other courts to grant a similar privilege due to the traditional deference the Supreme Court has accorded the summons power. 90
The Fifth Circuit has already rejected such an approach. 9 '
proceedings [an IRS tax investigation]." Id at 388. For a discussion of the court's
analysis of this privilege, see notes 60-62 and accompanying text supra.
81. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 150 (1975). For a discussion of
Biscegh'a, see note 10 supra. Although Congress has enacted legislation requiring certification of financial statements of public corporations by indeoendent accountants,
it has not seen fit to protect this information with a privilege. Cf. 677 F.2d at 222
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Given that the Supreme
Court has stated that the scope of an IRS summons should not be limited absent
unambiguous congressional direction, it is difficult to justify a court-fashioned workproduct privilege limitation to a summons. See 420 U.S. at 150.
82. Cf.677 F.2d at 222 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
For a discussion of Judge Newman's position, see note 65 and accompanying text
supra.

83. United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 716. For a discussion of Euge, see note
11 and accompanying text supra.
84. Id
85. Couch v. United States, 429 U.S. 322 (1973). For a discussion of Couch, see
notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
86. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
87. For a discussion of the content of tax accrual workpapers, see note 23 and
accompanying text supra.
88. For a discussion of the Arthur Young court's limited privilege, see notes 60-62
and accompanying text supra. For the federal securities laws on which the court
based its holding, see note 24 supra.
89. See, e.g., Caplin Should the Service be Permtted to Reach Accountant's Tax Accrual
Workpapers, supra note 22, at 199 (corporate records destroyed by fire).
90. For a discussion of this deference, see notes 10-11 and accompanying text
supra.

91. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982),petttonfor cert.
filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716). For a discussion of El Paso,
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It is submitted that in light of the split amongst the circuits, 92 the
Supreme Court should resolve the issues surrounding tax accrual
workpapers. The best solution, however, would be for Congress to delineate
the scope of the IRS summons power, given the conflicting congressional
policies involved. 93 It is suggested that a statutory solution similar to that
proposed by the Arthur Young court in the present case would be both fair
94
and equitable.
Jeffey Markowi'tz

see notes 17 & 39 and accompanying text supra. See also United States v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal dzsmzsed as moot, 623 F.2d
720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980). For a discussion ofArthurAndersen, see

notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra.
92. For a discussion of the approaches taken by the circuits, see notes 14-17 &
28-31 and accompanying text supra. Three approaches to tax accrual workpapers
have been enunciated by the circuit courts. The Second Circuit has granted a limited privilege. 677 F.2d at 220. The Tenth Circuit has declared such workpapers
irrelevant to an IRS audit. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615 (10th
Cir. 1977). Finally, the Fifth Circuit and the District Court of Massachusetts have
rejected both these arguments, holding that tax accrual workpapers are within the
scope of an IRS summons. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir.
1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716);
United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal
d~mzssedas moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).

93. See notes 54-59 and accompanying text supra.
94. See notes 54-62 and accompanying text supra.
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